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Nathan A. Burke 
 
In Mays v. City of Flint Michigan, Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality employees removed a class action against them in 
the Michigan state court to federal court under the federal-officer removal 
statute. This court ruled in favor of the residents of Flint, determining that 
the federal officer removal statute did not give the federal court 
jurisdiction over a state agency simply because the agency must follow 
federal rules. The court held that Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality employees could not have been “acting under” the federal 
government even though the state agency’s enforcement authority could 
be trumped by the EPA. In addition, the court held that a state law tort 
claim relying on the violation of federal law is not a substantial question 
of federal law. This ruling reinforced the ability of individuals to hold their 
local agencies accountable in local courts. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Mays v. City of Flint, Michigan arose out of the poor condition of drinking-
water in Flint, Michigan.1 The plaintiffs were Flint residents who also 
sought to represent others harmed by the Flint drinking-water crisis.2 The 
defendants were state officials from Flint (collectively “City”) and 
employees of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
(collectively “MDEQ”).3 After the plaintiffs filed their complaint in 
Michigan state court, MDEQ filed a removal notice in federal district court 
on two grounds: (1) the federal-officer removal statute,4 and (2) federal-
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.5 The plaintiffs opposed 
removal, and their motion to remand back to state court was granted by 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.6 On 
review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision, holding that state court was the proper forum 
because MDEQ failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that federal 





                                                 
1.  Mays v. City of Flint, Mich., 871 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 
2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id.   
4.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012)). 
5.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441). 
6.  Id.  
7.  Id. at 450. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
  
In April 2014, the City switched its drinking water source from 
the City of Detroit to the Flint River to save money.8 Despite a City-
commissioned report in 2011 that concluded the Flint River water was 
“highly corrosive and unsafe” for drinking, MDEQ failed to introduce 
corrosion-control treatment to the water.9 The plaintiffs contend that 
MDEQ and the City knew that changing the Flint drinking water source 
would cause substantial negative health effects, but did so anyway for 
fiscal purposes.10 The plaintiffs also assert that after months of citizen 
complaints, MDEQ and the City failed to inform the public of health issues 
caused by the drinking water and did nothing to remedy the water 
quality.11   
In January 2016, several of the plaintiffs filed a class action 
lawsuit against the City and MDEQ in Genesee Circuit Court.12 The 
plaintiffs alleged that MDEQ “deliberately ignored” information about the 
unsafe, corrosive nature of the water, and “falsely reassured the public… 
that the water was safe to drink.”13 The complaint contained “state-law 
claims of gross negligence, fraud, assault and battery, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”14 
In April 2016, MDEQ filed a notice of removal in United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.15 In response, the 
plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case back to state court.16 The 
plaintiffs’ motion to remand was granted, and MDEQ appealed the 
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.17 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
  
The central question before the court was whether the district 
court properly remanded the case to the Genesee County Circuit Court 
instead of allowing removal to federal court.18 Removal is proper when the 
party seeking removal meets its burden of showing that the federal court 
has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue.19 Here, MDEQ 
asserted two grounds for why federal jurisdiction was proper: (1) the 
actions of MDEQ were taken under the direction of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”),  therefore invoking the federal-officer 
                                                 
8.  Id. at 440. 
9.  Id. at 440-41. 
10.  Id. at 440. 
11.  Id. at 441. 
12.  Id. at 440. 
13.  Id. at 441 (citations omitted). 
14.  Id. at 440. 
15.  Id. at 441. 
16.  Id. at 442. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. 
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removal statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); and (2) the complaint 
involved issues entitling MDEQ to federal-question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441.20 
 
A.  The Federal-Officer Removal Statute 
 
The federal-officer removal statute allows civil actions to be 
removed to federal court when the defendant is a federal officer.21 The 
statute also allows other defendants, such as MDEQ, to remove lawsuits  
from state court to federal district court when the defendant establishes: 
(1) they “acted under” a federal officer; (2) the action was “performed 
under color of federal office”; and (3) the defendant raises a “colorable 
federal defense.”22 The court primarily focused on whether MDEQ “acted 
under” the EPA when they caused the alleged harm.23 
MDEQ argued that it acted under a federal officer because it was 
sued for actions taken while under the EPA’s control.24 The EPA delegated 
enforcement to MDEQ to implement the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule 
(“LCR”) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”).25 The defendants 
argued that because MDEQ mandatorily reported compliance with SDWA 
and LCR to the EPA, MDEQ was “acting under” the EPA.26 MDEQ felt 
that the EPA’s ability to withdraw MDEQ’s primary enforcement 
authority of these regulations also indicated that the EPA had control over 
MDEQ.27 In addition, MDEQ asserted that the emergency order issued by 
the EPA to MDEQ in January 2016, which directed MDEQ to take specific 
actions in relation to the water quality crisis, proved MDEQ “acted under” 
the EPA and satisfied the federal-officer removal statute.28   
The court rejected MDEQ’s argument for two primary reasons.29 
First, the court found that the relationship between MDEQ and the EPA 
could not be accurately described as “acting under” for the purpose of the 
statute.30 In the most recent Supreme Court discussion of the statute, 
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., the Court  explained that “[s]imply 
complying with a regulation is insufficient, even if the regulatory scheme 
is ‘highly detailed’ and the defendant's ‘activities are highly supervised 
and monitored.’”31 The  Court in Watson also indicated that the federal 
government must act as the defendant’s superior to satisfy the “acting 
                                                 
20.  Id. at 441. 
21.  Id. at 442 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). 
22.  Id. at 442-43 (citing Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1085 
(6th Cir. 2010). 
23.  Id. at 449. 
24.  Id. at 441. 
25.  Id.  
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. at 444, 447. 
30.  Id. at 444. 
31.  Id. (quoting Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 153 (2007)).  
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under” requirement.32 In cases where a non-federal government defendant 
was successfully removed to district court in other circuit courts, this court 
found an agreement between the parties that specified the inferior-superior 
relationship between the defendant and the federal government.33 Here, 
the court concluded the defendant’s mandatory compliance reports were 
not enough to satisfy the phrase “acting under.”34 MDEQ and the EPA had 
“no contract, no employer/employee relationship, nor any other indication 
of a principal/agent arrangement.”35 The EPA was also not involved in 
approving the decision to switch Flint’s water supply.36 The court agreed 
that the defendant’s clearest indicator that MDEQ may have acted on 
behalf of the EPA was the EPA-issued emergency order on January 21, 
2016.37 However, the court noted that the order was issued two days after 
the plaintiffs filed their complaint, and therefore it had no impact on the 
actions that the plaintiffs challenged.38 The court found that the EPA’s 
ability to intervene if a state failed to meet regulatory requirements was 
not convincing because the state retains its rights to enforce its own laws 
until that state failed.39 The plaintiffs’ complaint arose from actions by 
MDEQ while the state was enforcing its own laws and regulations.40 
Therefore, the court concluded that MDEQ was not “acting under” the 
EPA.41 
The court also rejected MDEQ’s argument because MDEQ was 
not the type of defendant the federal-officer removal statute was intended 
to protect.42 The federal-officer removal statute was written to protect 
federal agents enforcing federal policies from potential bias in state 
courts.43 The court felt that there was no reason for the local courts to be 
biased toward MDEQ because it was not enforcing the federal SDWA; 
rather, MDEQ was enforcing Michigan’s own version of the federal law.44  
The court noted that the defendants in all three cases Watson cited 
to support its broad interpretation of “acting under” were federal officers 
or employees of a federal officers.45 In this case, however, the defendants 
were state officials sued under state tort law for actions taken while 
                                                 
32.  Id. (citing Watson, 551 U.S. at 151).  
33.  Id. at 445 (citing Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 134, 
137–38 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
34.  Id. at 446 (citing Watson, 551 U.S. at 156). 
35.  Id. at 444.  
36.  Id. at 446. 
37.  Id. at 447. 
38.  Id.  
39.  Id. 
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. at 449. 
42.  Id. at 447. 
43.  Id. at 448. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. (citing Watson, 551 U.S. at 147; Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 
232, 234–36 (1981); Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 403 (1969); Colorado v. 
Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 514–16 (1932)). 
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enforcing state law.46 The court found that the federal-officer removal 
statute was not enacted to protect the type of defendant in this case, and 
that precedent did not allow the court to define “acting under” so broadly 
as to include MDEQ’s actions in relation to the EPA.47  
 
B.  Federal Question Removal 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1441 allows removal to district court when the state-
law claim contains a federal issue that is: (1) necessarily raised; (2) 
actually disputed; (3) substantial; and (4) “capable of resolution in federal 
court without disrupting the federal-state balance.”48 MDEQ argued that 
that because the plaintiffs’ complaint cited the LCR and SDWA to 
establish that MDEQ breached its duties, federal interpretation issues were 
implicated.49 However, the court stated that a state tort claim relying on 
the violation of a federal statute as an element of the tort is “insufficiently 
‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”50 In addition, 
situations where Congress has not provided a private right of action in 
federal law are less likely to favor removal.51 Because the plaintiffs’ claims 
only relied on federal law to prove elements of torts and there is no private 
right of action under SDWA or LCR, the court concluded that there was 
no federal question jurisdiction in this case.52 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In Mays v. City of Flint, Mich., the court ruled in favor of Flint 
residents, determining that the district court properly held that it did not 
have jurisdiction over the complaint filed against MDEQ. The court held 
that MDEQ was not “acting under” the EPA in accordance with the 
federal-removal statute when it made the decision to change the drinking-
water source. Although the court noted that a state officer has never been 
able to invoke the federal officer removal statute in the past, the court 
seemed convinced that a federal order to a state agency, like the emergency 
order issued by the EPA in this case, could allow federal officer removal 
for state officers. The complaint also did not raise substantial federal 
issues, even though the plaintiffs’ tort claims relied on violations of federal 
law.  
 
                                                 
46.  Id. at 449. 
47.  Id. at 448. 
48.  Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013)). 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 
814 (1986) (citations omitted)). 
51.  Id. at 450 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & 
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318 (2005)). 
52.  Id. (citing Harding–Wright v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 350 
F.Supp.2d 102, 106–07 (D.D.C. 2005)). 
